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Reviewed by Eugene V. Rostowt
In our "troubles" about Vietnam, Professor John Norton Moore
has been an active belligerent on the home front. He has participated
in a long cycle of debates before innumerable conferences, symposia,
teach-ins, colloquia, and congressional and other committee hearings.
He has spoken on television, and written regularly for the law journals.
In this role, Moore earned high and equal respect from those who
agree with him, and from those who do not. This is a considerable
achievement, both of mind and of spirit, for our troubles over Viet-
nam have been more vehemently emotional, and less accessible to
reason, than any we have had to endure since the Civil War. And
the sector where Moore has been active-that of contention about the
legality of our course in Indo-China-was necessarily the eye of the
storm. We are people of the Book. To our minds, whatever we dis-
like intensely must also be illegal. The claim that the policy of the
United States in Indo-China violated international law, or the law
of our own Constitution, was the natural, and indeed the nearly in-
dispensable predicate for a vast and inflamed literature charging
the nation with immorality, aggression, imperialism, and other sins
and crimes hideous to our notion of ourselves as a people.
Confronting this outcry, Moore remained unflappably the profes-
sor: courteous, moderate, scrupulous in his respect for the evidence,
meticulously fair to the arguments of his adversaries, and learned, re-
sourceful, and thoughtful in developing his own.
With admirable discipline, Citizen Moore never states his political
position on American policy in South East Asia. The reader closes the
book without a hint I could detect indicating Moore's opinion about
the wisdom, efficacy, and prudence of the nation's course in Vietnam.
Professor Moore's subject is its legality, which he vindicates in terms
I find unanswerable.
t Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale Law School.
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I
While Law and the Indo-China War consists in large part of papers
prepared for "Vietnam" occasions during the last five or six years, the
title is a misnomer. Less than a third of the book concerns the war in
Indo-China. And even within that third, Moore treats Vietnam simply
as a case study in international and constitutional law.
Most important books in the history of social studies-perhaps all
of them-were tracts for their times, addressed to the issues which
happened to be acute at the moment. This is emphatically true of
Moore's Law and the Indo-China War. It is a response to the Viet-
nam tragedy. But that is its least important characteristic. Reaching
far beyond Vietnam, it is a major book about certain aspects of the
law of nations purporting to govern the international use of force
by and from states-certainly one of the three or four genuinely fine
works of scholarship on the subject published during the last decade.
It also contains an excellent treatment of our own constitutional law
on the respective powers of Congress and the President in authorizing
the use of force in international relations.'
Like every other modem student of international law, Moore con-
fronts the challenge of McDougal's magisterial presence.2 Moore was
McDougal's student, as Schwebel, Falk, Rosalyn Higgins, Oda, Weston,
Burke, Reisman, and so many other young scholars were, and are.
Like them, Moore found his relationship with McDougal stimulating
without being oppressive. McDougal is certainly strong-minded. But
he has an innate and unshakable respect for the autonomy of his
1. J.N. MooRE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA NVAI (1972) [hereinafter cited to page num-
bers only]. Considerations of space confine this review to Moore's treatment of certain
problems of international law. His three chapters on the constitutional relationship be.
tween Congress and the President in making national security decisions, and between
both political branches of the government and the courts, are of excellent quality, and,
save in detail, I agree with their analysis and conclusions. See Rostow, Great Cases Maa
Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 T.x. L. REv. 833 (1972).
I should note also my regret that in preparing these papers for publication, Moore
did not edit them to minimize duplication.
2. There is a terminological problem, and a problem of fairness, in referring to
McDougal's writings, even in international law, without referring also to Harold Lass.
well's, and to their joint work. The McDougal-Lasswell collaboration has certainly been
one of the most important, and most fruitful, in modern intellectual history. Together,
they hammered out their particular version of sociological jurisprudence as a juris.
prudence of values. The most striking feature of their theory is a scheme for classilying,
clarifying and evaluating the variables involved in the analysis of any body of law In
terms of the social goals a particular community wishes to see fulfilled by its law. The
purpose of each such analysis is to determine (a) whether the law-in.fact corresponds
to existing standards of social morality; (b) whether the existing standards of social
morality correspond to the aspirations of society for its law; and (c) whether the pre.
vailing aspirations for law match those which McDougal and Lasswell believe should
prevail in the long run.
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students. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of McDougal's influ-
ence as a teacher is that so few of his pupils experience a need to
demonstrate their independence by rebelling. Nearly all his students
who have become legal scholars use McDougal and Lisswell's basic
approach to the study of law-often, as in the case of Falk or Oda,
to reach conclusions with which McDougal himself would disagree.
But this is the essence of McDougal's work. He has established not
a sect, but a school. In almost every case, his students are indeed
scholars, not acolytes. What they learn from McDougal and Lasswell
is a systematic way to study law, and to judge it, as an integral part
of the social process, in its relationship to all the forces, social and
moral, which shape the law, and guide its course through time.
Thus Moore starts his book with seventy-five pages which make
explicit his view of international law as law, and of the American na-
tional interest in its integrity and enforcement.
Moore is concerned with three aspects of international law: (1)
with the process through which legal norms are achieved by the inter-
play in world politics of competing and complementary goals for poli-
cy, and above all by "the common interest of states in a reciprocally
tolerant international milieu"; 3 (2) with the influence of the existing
norms of international law on the behavior of states, and as criteria
for appraising their behavior; and (3) with the goodness or badness
of the existing norms, evaluated in accordance with personal stand-
ards which, he contends, should be accepted as those of the world
community at large. Rejecting the naivet6 of would-be cynics who
claim that international law is an illusion, and the equal naivet6 of
utopians who overestimate its potentialities in a revolutionary world,
Moore defines the international law he is talking about as that con-
cerned with the management of international conflict, especially where
there is a risk that military force might be used internationally. What
in fact are the expectations of the world community of states about
the rightful limits of international conflict? How are those expecta-
tions articulated? By whom, and to what extent are deviations pre-
vented or redressed? How effective are these community expectations
as norms inhibiting the conduct of states?
Adapting the classification and analytic methods of the McDougal-
Lasswell approach, Moore identifies the modes through which world
politics secretes world law. By keeping the entire process of world
politics in view, Moore puts the successive disputes involving a breach
3. P. 3.
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of international peace since 1945 into a perspective which stresses the
widespread (though by no means universal) acceptance by states of
their common interest in the enforcement of the Charter of the United
Nations.
There is an occasional touch of political innocence in the book. For
example, Moore writes that action which violates the international
community's clear sense of what states should not do by way of using
force
may entail a high cost even if it does not lead to dramatic sanc-
tions. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, though a paradigm
of unsanctioned action in the traditional sense, was achieved only
at a real and perhaps intolerably high cost to Soviet leadership
in the communist and third-world nations. The cost was not mere-
ly attributable to immediate self-interest or moral revulsion but
was in significant measure a product of violation of fundamental
community expectations concerning the authoritativeness of such
unilateral acts.
4
Alas, there is no evidence to support Moore's view. The political
influence of the Soviet Union throughout the world was enhanced by
the chilling demonstration in 1968 of her willingness to use force
effectively for political ends, even against another "Socialist" state.
Certain nations of Eastern Europe ruled by Communist parties actually
joined in the invasion, although their people surely found the exer-
cise repugnant. Since 1968, all those nations, including Roumania and
Yugoslavia, have conducted their domestic and international affairs
with acute circumspection. Similarly, for some years after 1968, both
North Korea and North Vietnam became more sharply responsive to,
and dependent upon, the Soviet Union than before.
In the third world, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, India and many other na-
tions increased their reliance on Soviet support during the same period,
often at the expense of Chinese influence, and the Soviet role in
Communist and other revolutionary parties and movements became
stronger, even in France and Italy. The United States and its allies,
respecting Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, as they had done since
4. P. 18. See also p. 25.
There are other instances of the same phenomenon. For example, Moore urges that
the Legal Adviser of the State Department be called Under-secretary of State for Inter-
national Legal Affairs, and made an ex officio member of the National Security Council
(p. 249), in the hope that considerations of international law be given greater weight
in the decision-making process. I have never observed a failure to give the views of the
Legal Adviser full consideration in the decision-making process. In any event, lie will
not be assured a greater hearing by giving him a grander title. It is not unknown for
Undersecretaries or even Secretaries to be ignored when Presidents make up their minds.
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1945, did nothing to protect Czechoslovakia, although they warned the
Soviet Union, after the event, not to "unleash the dogs of war."'
Despite their propaganda, the Western nations hoped that the epi-
sode would help move Soviet policy to accept the principle of mutual
and reciprocal respect for the proclaimed state interests of the other side
which the West regards as the indispensable rule for containing and
ultimately ending the Cold War.
In one significant respect, of course, the demonstration backfired.
China, alarmed by more and more ominous Soviet threats, turned to
the United States in 1971-not because the world had penalized the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but because it failed to do so.
But Moore's argument-however weak in this instance-illustrates
the strength and value of his method. Public opinion, where it can be
made manifest, is indeed a source of law. Moore systematically con-
siders all the relevant factors in his effort to make clear the policy
goals various norms of international law should be made to serve,
and the interpretation of the norms required by those policies in
particular situations.
II
The starting point for Moore's book is the controversy over the
legality of American policy in Vietnam, and we should examine that
part of his text first.
The official American theory of the Indo-China war has been that
two Vietnamese states emerged both before and emphatically after the
Geneva Conference of 1954, as confirmed by the cease-fire signed by
the French and the Vietminh, and in effect accepted by the govern-
ments represented at Geneva, and then by the society of nations. The
expectation of the international community, as the United States per-
ceived it, was that those states-South Vietnam and North Vietnam-
like North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, and East and West
Germany, might be united someday by political agreement, but not
by force. This position was the predicate for the SEATO Treaty, and
thus publicly declared to be a state interest of the United States and
of its Allies, vital in their view to their own security, and to the process
of consolidating peace. The use of force by North Vietnam to conquer
South Vietnam (ind Laos and Cambodia as well) was therefore im-
permissible-impermissible legally, if the precedents of Greece and
5. Remarks by President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Convention of Milk Producers,
Aug. 30, 1968, in 2 L.B. JOHNSON, PUBLIC PAPES Or T1E PaRsm Lns OF nlE UNrrED STATES
917, 920 (1970); Remarks, 125th Anniversary Meeting of B'nai B'ritth, Sept. 10, 19, ,id.
at 944, 946.
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Korea are valid as a construction of the Charter; and impermissible
politically, in the context of the fragile balance of power so laboriously
achieved and maintained since 1947, which is all we have by way of
peace. The first rule of politics for maintaining that balance, in the
official view, is that unilateral change achieved by force cannot be
allowed. This was the principle on which American policy rested in
each of the successive Cold War crises since 1945-from Iran, Turkey,
and Greece to Berlin, Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. It is the principle
on which American policy has insisted so tenaciously in the negotia-
tions leading to the Vietnam cease-fire announced in January, 1973.
Three competing theories challenge this thesis.
The first is that the war between North and South Vietnam has
been a civil war, not an international war. The Soviet Union took the
same position with regard to the war in Korea. On August 3, 1950,
speaking of Korea, the Soviet spokesman at the Security Council said:
As regards the war between the North and South Koreans, it is
a civil war and therefore does not come under the definition of
aggression, since it is a war, not between two States, but between
two parts of the Korean people temporarily split into two camps
under two separate authorities.
The conflict in Korea is thus an internal conflict. Consequently
rules relating to aggression are just as inapplicable to the North
and South Koreans as the concept of aggression was inapplicable
to the northern and southern states of America, when they were
fighting a civil war for the unification of their country.,
Moore effectively marshals the evidence to demolish this argument,
as applied to the Vietnam case. The history of the Geneva Conference
justifies the conclusion, at a minimum, that the parties expected the
cease-fire partition of the country at the 17th parallel to result in an-
other "divided country," like Korea and Germany, "which, sooner or
later (probably much later) would somehow be reunified."" The Con-
6. 5 U.N. SCOR, 482nd meeting 5 (1950).
7. C. COOPER, THE LoST CRUSADE: AMERicA IN ViETNAM 100 (1970). Lauterpacht con.
sidered two states to have come into existence in Vietnam well before the Geneva Con.
ference. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 255-58 (8th ed., Lauterpacht ed. 1955). In
R. RANDLE, GENEVA 1954 (1969), the most thorough study thus far published on the
Geneva Conference, the author concludes (p. 445) that:
Within their respective zones ... the DRVN and SVN (later, the RVN) governments
exercised functional sovereignty in 1955 and 1956; that is, each governmnental entity
controlled the civil service, bureaucracy, police, and armed forces, and each entity
had brought a modicum of order, at least temporarily, to the areas under its jur-
isdiction.
The real settlement at Geneva, Moore concludes, was partition, since the parties never
really agreed to much more than a territorial division and a cease-fire (p. 419). Sec
also B. MURTI, VIETNAm DIVmED V, 171-76 (1964); Wright, International Law and Civil
Strife, 1959 PROC. Am. SociTY INT. LAW 145, 151.
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ference, Cooper says, gave "international blessing to the independence
of Laos and Cambodia and establish[ed] two political entities in Viet-
nam."s
Whatever the parties may have intended at the time, however, it is
manifest under standard rules of international law and practice that
for some twenty years there have been two states within the Viet-
namese nation, to borrow Chancellor Brandt's phrase about the situa-
tion in Germany, as there are in Korea.9 The General Assembly of the
United Nations recommended United Nations membership for South
Vietnam three times. Many nations have diplomatic relations with
South Vietnam or North Vietnam. Both North and South Vietnam
exercise the normal authority of governments within their territories
at least as effectively as most governments, and more effectively than
many. In 1957, the Soviet Union supported a package deal for the
simultaneous admission to the United Nations of North and South
Vietnam, North and South Korea, and East and West Germany. One
can test the seriousness of the Soviet assertion that it is lawful to unite
divided nations by force by imagining their reaction if West Germany
decided one day to liberate East Germany, with the backing of its
NATO allies.
As Moore emphasizes, there is no way to distinguish the legal and
political problems of Korea and of Vietnam. 10 Like Vietnam, Korea
is a "country," a "nation," divided against its will by the circum-
stances of world politics. Indeed, the Korean people are far more
clearly a nation, ethnically and historically, than the inhabitants of
the areas we now call Vietnam-more unified in religion, language,
and background, with a longer experience of shared cultural and
political experience. The Korean people, under Japanese occupation
since 1895, were promised their unity and independence by the Soviet
Union and the Western Allies at Cairo and Potsdam. Soviet forces
accepted the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel in 1945.
8. CooPEa, supra note 7, at 98.
9. Friedmann remarks, "It may be conceded that North and South Vietnam are today
de facto separate states, even though the Geneva Agreement of 1954 spoke of 'two zones.'"
Friedmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 AM. J. INT'L L
857, 866 (1965). Taylor concludes that "the two zones [of Vietnam] took on the at-
tributes of independent states." T. TAYLOR, NURUIBER0 AND VIETNAM: AN AMEPzCAn
TRAGEDY 102 (1970).
Moore treats the problem conclusively at 359-63 and 408.22, and in JN. MooRE & J.
UNDERWOOD (in collaboration with M. McDougal), THE L,,wFuLNEss OF UNITED STATES As-
SISTANCE TO THE RIEPUBUC OF VIET NAM 4-29 (1966).
10. The background of the Korean war is well treated in 2 R. Hi ci.s, UNITED NA-
TIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967, at 153-75 (1970). See T. Yoo, THE KoEA.N WAR AND THE
UNITED NATIONS (1965); L. GOODRICH, KOREA: A STUDY OF UNrED STATES POLICY IN TIE
UNITED NATIONS (1956).
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Installing a Communist regime in their zone, they blocked all efforts
to obtain a free election in North Korea, while in South Korea, a
regime developed which the General Assembly in repeated resolutions
characterized as
[A] lawful government... having effective control and jurisdic-
tion over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission
was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority
of the people of all Korea reside . . . . [T]his Government is
based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will
of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed
by the Temporary Commission; and . . . this is the only such
Government in Korea."1
When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, the Security Coun-
cil-the Soviet Union being absent in protest against the presence of
Nationalist China-noted that there had been an "armed attack upon
the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea" and determined
"that this action constitutes a breach of the peace."12
If North and South Korea are two states within the contemplation
of the Charter-and no other premise can support the conclusion that
the use of force from North Korea to conquer South Korea in 1950
was a "breach of the peace" and an "aggression" justifying both South
Korea's self-defense, and armed assistance to South Korea by many
states-the same judgment is required a fortiori for the relationship
of North and South Vietnam during the hostilities of the last fourteen
years.
The critics of the legality of the American course in Vietnam do
not, at least in their professional writings, really deny the fact that
there are two Vietnamese states with as much right to international
protection against "armed attack" as South Korea had in 1950.13 In-
11. See HIGGINs, supra note 10, at 159.
12. Id. at 160.
13. The best known of these critics, Professor Richard A. Falk of Princeton, attempts
to distinguish the legal problem in Vietnam from that in Korea on the ground (1) that
the armed attack of North Vietnam on South Vietnam, assuming that it occurred, was
"covert" rather than "overt," a distinction whose relevance to the legal problem Is
obscure, to say the least; and (2) that there was a "global consensus" in support of
defensive action by South Korea, whereas no such consensus existed in support of South
Vietnam's rights, at least by 1966 and 1967.
The first of Falk's arguments is simply incredible. The argument of "uncertainty"
about North Vietnam's role in the war could not have been made with any conviction
in the early sixties. See D. PIKE, WAR, PEACE, AND THE VIET CONG (1969); VIr CONo
(1966); S. HOSMER, VIET CONG REPRESSION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TilE FTuRE (1970).
After 1968, and especially after May, 1972, it could not have been made at all.
Falk does not, of course, deny that North Vietnam has intervened with military force
in South Vietnam. Instead, he argues that North Vietnam made great efforts to keep
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stead, they move to a second theory to justify the armed attack by
North Vietnam against South Vietnam. They claim that the reunifica-
don of North and South Vietnam was promised the Vietnamese peo-
ple by the great powers through a referendum in 1956. The failure
to hold that referendum, they argue, entitles North Vietnam to seek
national unity through military means in the name of self-determina-
don.
Again, Moore has little trouble in disposing of the point.
In the first place, as he shows conclusively, no such international
promise was made, since the only possible source of such a "promise"
is the reference to elections in paragraph 7 of the Declaration issued
by the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference at its conclusion."4
its policy "covert" rather than "overt"--presumably by insisting on the fiction that it
has not intervened at all.
[T]herefore, and this is critical for my approach, a unilateral defensive extra.
territorial response to covert coercion cannot possibly acquire the same legitimacy
as would such a response if made to overt coercion. For these reasons I find it in-
appropriate to rely upon the Korean analogy; the Spanish Civil War I continue to
regard as a helpful precedent because there was no counter-intervention undertaken
[against Italy and Germany] (emphasis added).
1 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 490 (R. Falk ed. 1968).
The sequence of the sentences is astonishing. The Chinese said that their troops in
Korea were volunteers, yet Falk continues to support American policy in Korea. And in
Spain, Germany and Italy made no effort to keep their intervention "covert." Surely
the decision of the Western nations not to help the government of Spain during the
Spanish Civil War, and the inability of Spain to strike back at Italy and Germany. does
not prove that they had no right to do so under international law. Failure to do all one
is legally entitled to do in a given instance hardly proves that legal rights have ceased
to exist.
As for Falk's second argument, the state of world opinion in behalf of South Korea's
right of individual and collective self-defense was hardly a "global consensus" in 1950.
As Falk notes, both the Soviet Union and Communist China, as well as the Communist
nations of Eastern Europe, bitterly opposed what the United Nations did. Public opinion
in the United States and other countries did not turn against the war in Vietnam for
years after it had been authorized and begun. Falk nowhere explains why the state of
public opinion (as distinguished from official decisions) determines the legality of war.
R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIoLrENr WoRLD 265-70 (1968); 1 TitE VIETNAMI WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 489-90 (R. Falk ed. 1968).
I have been unable to find any other attempt in the professional literature to dis-
tinguish the legal problem in Korea from that in Vietnam. On this point, too, Moore's
treatment is convincing. See E. ROs-row, PEACE IN TItE BALANCE 183-91 (1972). Cf. Jessup,
Book Review, 82 YALE L.J. 611, 614-15 (1973).
14. Particularly at pp. 412-22.
The text of Article 7 of the Final Declaration of July 21, 1954, issued by Great Britain
and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, is as follows:
7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet Nam is concerned, the settlement of
political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence,
unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the
fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result
of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress
in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions
obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July
1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representa-
tives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to
in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this
The Yale Law Journal
That Declaration was supported generally by four of the nine partici-
pants in the Conference, and formally rejected both by the United
States and South Vietnam.
In the second place, even if there had been such a pledge, the use
of force by North Vietnam to unify the nation could not be squared
with the Charter of the United Nations. Article 51 of the Charter,
acknowledging the inherent right of self-defense, is the only excep-
tion to the rule of Article 2(4) forbidding "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."1
But the concept of the sovereign right of self-defense embodied in
Article 51 of the Charter, however broadly construed, cannot be made
to cover the breach of international agreements as an inherently coer-
cive act, in itself justifying a counter use of force by the state ag-
grieved. This is precisely what was determined by the international
community with respect to the British and French attack on Egypt
in 1956, and in the Korean case as well. In the Suez crisis of 1956,
Britain and France justified their limited attack on Egypt in part
by the claim that the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal vio-
lated its international obligations, embodied in treaties.10 Similarly,
in the Korean case, the invasion was justified on the ground that
Korea had not yet been unified by political means, although the
subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from July
20, 1955 onwards.
Quoted in R. RANDLE, GENEVA 1954, at 570-71 (1969). Randle concludes that on any one
of the possible theories as to the juridical status of South Vietnam, it violated no rules
of customary international law or treaty law in refusing to be bound by the political
provisions of the Declaration. Id. at 447, 454.
15. Except for a use of force undertaken or authorized by the United Nations itself.
It is sometimes claimed, as the United States did during the Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962, that under Article 52, and Chapter VIII more generally, regional organizations
may use force even without Security Council authorization, and without regard to the
limitations of Article 51. Moore discusses this claim at 146 and 332-38. I agree with him
that the American argument based on Article 52 cannot be reconciled with the basic plan
of the Charter, particularly its concept of the Security Council, to say nothing of the
language of Article 53, which provides that "no enforcement action slall be undertaken
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council," language notably different from that of Article 51. As Moore points
out, such a rule would give regional organizations at least the powers of the Security
Council to use force by their own fiat, sans veto, sans Secretary General, sans debate,
and above all sans the presence of all-or indeed, in the case of the Arab League, con-
sidered as a regional organization, sans the presence of even one of the permanent
members.
The separate and more general question as to the legitimacy of the international use
of force in behalf of the self-determination of peoples is discussed, infra, at pp. 847-18.
16. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND Tre MIDDLE
EAST CRISIS (1957); B. AvRAm, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUEZ CANAL STATUS FROM 1860 UP TO
1956 (1958); J. OBnETA, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE SUEZ CANAL (1960); H. TIlOmAS,
SUEZ (1966, 1967); UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE SUEZ CANAL 'RonuLm: A
DOCUMENTARY PUaLICATION (Pub. Doc. No. 6342, 1956); Huang, Some International and
Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 277 (1957).
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Korean people had been assured independence and reunification at
Cairo and Potsdam, and in a succession of General Assembly Resolu-
dons thereafter.17 As Moore points out, quoting McNair, the breach
even of a treaty can never as such amount to an "armed attack"
justifying a resort to force in self-defense.' 8
The third argument of those who contend that the American course
in Vietnam is illegal rests on the opposite premise: that there are in-
deed two states in Vietnam, not one; that a prolonged civil war has
been taking place within the state of South Vietnam (a civil war which
has long since reached the level of "insurgency" or even "belligerency");
and that North Vietnam and other states are entitled under inter-
national law to assist the insurrectionary group, the N.L.F.
Since the normal rule of international law is that during a civil
war states may assist the widely recognized government of the state
concerned if they wish to do so, but not the rebels, this astonishing
assertion requires some acrobatics.'0 The "traditional" ihternational
law on the subject, the critics allege, is obsolete, because it is designed
to preserve "the status quo," and oppose "revolution." They claim
that it should be and perhaps already has been discarded, both in
theory and in practice.
Once again, Moore answers his opponents clearly, analytically, and
conclusively. The rule of the Charter, and the overriding policy goals
of international law, he contends, justify South Vietnam (conceded
to be a separate state for the purposes of this argument) in defending
itself against any and every form of armed attack, including regular
or irregular military assistance to guerrillas, partisans, terrorists, or
17. The documents are conveniently summarized or reproduced in HIGGINS, supra note
10, at 153-72.
18. P. 364.
19. Pp. 159-63, 251-54. Professor Falk summarizes the rule in Introduction to TE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 11-16 (R. Falk ed. 1971). Professor W. Friedmann
commented on the subject in comparable terms in Intereention and International Law 1,
in INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 40 (R. Jaquet ed. 1971). Friedmann remarks:
We will later come back to the problem of intervention in civil wars. Although.
regrettable (sic), lawyers of repute have been found to justify, not in terms of policy
but of international law, unilateral interventions of which the) approve politically,
there cannot be any serious doubt that such unilateral military actions designed to
change the political regime of another country-whether the) come to power by
democratic means or by a coup d'etat-are patently incompatible with the very
foundations of international law, which is built on the legal sovereignty of states
and their right to determine the form of their regime. Neither the assertion of
"socialist solidarity" nor the Johnson Doctrine which-going far beyond the actual
policies of the United States-would claim a unilateral right to displace an) "Com-
munist" regime, as determined by the United States-has any place in contemporary
international law.
Id. at 47.
The more general problems raised by Moore's treatment of the subject are discussed
at pp. 848-49 infra.
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armed bands conducting an insurrection within South Vietnam. By
the same token, the United States and other nations are privileged
under international law to assist in the defense of South Vietnam. In
accordance with the Caroline principle, and the many accepted in-
stances, before and since, in which the principle was applied to large
scale and to small scale hostilities, both South Vietnam and its allies
are legally entitled, in the conduct of their collective self-defense, to
carry the war to its sources in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. -"0
20. See ch. 10, particularly at pp. 488-510.
It is worthwhile to recall the circumstances of the Caroline case.
During an insurrection in Canada in 1837, the insurgents secured recruits and sup-
plies from the American side of the border. There was an encampment of one thou-
sand armed men organized at Buffalo, and located at Navy Island in Upper Canada;
there was another encampment of insurgents at Black Rock, on the American side.
The Caroline was a small steamer employed by these encampments. On December
29, 1837, while moored at Schlosser, on the American side of the Niagara River, and
while occupied by some thirty-three American citizens, the steamer was boarded by
an armed body of men from the Canadian side, who attacked the occupants. The
latter merely endeavored to escape. Several were wounded; one was killed on tie
dock; only twenty-one were afterwards accounted for. The attacking party fired
the steamer and set her adrift over Niagara Falls. In 1841, upon the arrest and
detention of one Alexander McLeod, in New York, on account of his alleged partici-
pation in the destruction of the vessel, Lord Palmerston avowed responsibility for
the destruction of the Caroline as a public act of force in self-defense, by persons
in the British service. He therefore demanded McLeod's release. McLeod was, how-
ever, tried in New York, and acquitted. In 1842 the two Governments agreed on
principle that the requirements of self-defense might necessitate the use of force.
Mr. Webster, Secretary of State, denied, however, that the necessity existed in this
particular case, while Lord Ashburton the British Minister, apologized for the in-
vasion of American territory.
V. FRiEDMANN, 0. LissITzYN & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 882 (1969); see J.B. MOORE,
DIGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906).
The correspondence on the subject between Great Britain and the United States ac-
cepted and confirmed (1) the responsibility of the United States for any use or threat
of force from its territory to assist revolutionary activities in Canada and (2) tile right
of the British to invade the United States in time of peace-and in advance of an
actual attack across the borders-for the limited purpose of attacking and dispersing the
guerrillas, in the absence of effective action to that end by the United States, which
owed Great Britain a legal duty to do so. See also 11 M. WHITEMAN, DiGEsr or INTER-
NATIONAL LAr 211-36 (1968) (discussion of the use of neutral territory as a base of opera-
tions or for hostile expeditions against other states). The Caroline principle was accepted
as part of the law of the Charter in the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Reports 4.
The argument that international law should confine the exercise of the right of self-
defense to the territory of the state being attacked is one of the more bizarre features
of the legal literature seeking to justify "wars of national liberation" and other wars
which appeal to the writers as ideologically sound. See R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A
VIOLENT WORLD 227-28 (1968). Moore is much too kind to this assertion. P. 258. Men
cannot be expected to await a threatened attack in their own territory. International
practice has long accepted that fact about the nature of man, and of states. Experience
with the problem is discussed in the diplomatic notes about the fate of the good ship
Caroline, and reflected today in Israeli attacks in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, intended
to persuade those governments to fulfill their international legal obligation to prevent
irregular military forces on their territory from operating against Israel. See also I.C.
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
240-44 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (American expedition into Mexico to check cross-border raids
by Villa which the Mexican authorities had failed to prevent); Rostow, supra note 1,
at 855-62 (United States invasions of Spanish Florida to disperse guerrillas operating from
that sanctuary against United States territory).
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The applicable rules of international law on the subject have been
restated over the years in a succession of carefully considered General
Assembly Resolutions, based on extended studies, committee reports,
and debates. In 1950, the General Assembly
condemning the intervention of a State in the internal affairs
of another State for the purpose of changing its legally established
government by the threat or use of force
1. Solemnly reaffirms that, whatever the weapons used, any
aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil
strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the
gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the
world .... 21
In 1954, the International Law Commission defined as offenses against
the peace and security of mankind the tolerance by a state of the use of
its territory by armed bands or terrorists planning to make incursions
into another state, or by groups intending to foment civil strife in
another state. 2 And in 1965 the General Assembly condemned armed
intervention and subversion, direct or indirect, and indeed every other
form of interference in the internal affairs of another state, as a viola-
tion of the Charter.
2 3
It is important, Moore urges, that the policies expressed in these
documents be enforced with special strictness for nations divided by
the Cold War, which are neuralgic focal points of dangerous great
power rivalry.24 Moore concludes that for Vietnam "the Charter pro-
scription outlawing the use of force as a modality of major change
is the most crucial norm for appraisal of the war.' '25
Examining the available data, he finds that North Vietnamese
participation in the rebellion against the government of South Viet-
nam was publicly evident at least by the late 1950s-well before the
first major American military response, in 1961.26 While international
practice and a large majority of the authorities have always upheld
the legality of international military assistance to a government deal-
21. G.A. Res. 380, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
22. Int'l L. Comm'n Report, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
23. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
These principles were reaffirmed-explicitly with reference to armistice demarcation
lines and cease-fire lines as well as to the legally recognized boundaries of states-in the
Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 122-24, U.N. Doc.
A/8082 (1970).
24. See pp. 94, 104, 221-25.
25. P. 461.
26. Pp. xxvi, 366-75, 462.
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ing with an insurrection, and denied the legality of military assistance
to the rebels, all the authorities (including those who question the
standard rule, or wish it were otherwise) agree that friendly states
may assist a government in putting down a rebellion when others have
converted a civil war into an international war by assisting the rebels.27
By any standard, Moore concludes, the United States assistance to
South Vietnam has been "a paradigm 0f lawful collective defense
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."
28
III
But the exercise of answering the standard arguments against the
legality of American and other foreign assistance to the government of
South Vietnam is no more than a prelude to the intellectual challenge
which attracts most of Moore's interest and energy in Law and the
Indo-China War.
Step by step, he is drawn by the process of debate into reviewing,
restating, and revising the international law about foreign participa-
tion in civil war. Here, I believe, his argument is more doubtful, at
least for the present reviewer, than his treatment of the legal issues
with regard to the Vietnam war itself-more doubtful, that is, as a
reading of the expectations of the international community, rather
than a personal version of what the law should be.
Like many of those with whom he has debated, he falls into the
habit of characterizing the basic policy of international law in this
regard as "the traditional view,"' 29 excessively formal, abstract, and
simplistic. And he gives much too much deference to the fashionable
protest that the classical rule-which would allow international as-
sistance to governments but not to rebels in civil war situations-is a
bulwark of the status quo, a veritable "Maginot line for vested privi-
leges, deterring necessary reforms in feudal or totalitarian socie-
ties .... 30
Many Americans, perhaps most Americans, rally automatically to
this bugle call. They cannot view themselves as "reactionaries" or even
as "conservatives," and find it difficult not to be defensive before the
charge that a rule of international law might delay or even suffocate
27. P. 463. See Friedmann, supra note 19, at 64. The debate is reviewed at pp. 848.49
infra.
28. P. xxv.
29. See, e.g., pp. 87-88.
30. P. 88.
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"progress." Naturally, they think, if a rule could have such an effect,
it must be wrong. Perhaps it isn't really the rule, or should in any
event be changed.
It is surprising that Moore seems to accept this proposition as a
self-evident axiom. He does not belong to any of the fashionable
cults of violence. Nor is he one of those "sad liberals" who have
come to the conclusion, "since decolonization, that a collectivized,
secretive, and totalitarian society is 'the only thing natives under-
stand.' "31
The battle cry, "Down with the status quo," is both erroneous and
irrelevant: erroneous, because most revolutions occur without inter-
national assistance; and irrelevant because it ignores the distinction
between matters primarily of international and of domestic concern
which is fundamental to world politics and to international law. In-
ternational law is not against revolutions or social change. It is against
the international use of force, whether for conquest or pillage, or to
advance a cause deemed sacred. Revolutions occur constantly without
international assistance. The French, Russian, Chinese and Cuban
revolutions took place without benefit of international military aid.
Governments have been changed by force more than twice a month
during recent years, usually without significant international assistance
to the revolutionaries. Enforcing Article 2(4) of the Charter rigorously
would have little effect on the number of revolutions that take place,
although no doubt such enforcement would affect the outcome in
some important instances.
But Moore follows his interlocutors down a slippery slope, and finds
himself, I think, in needless difficulty.
The problem for international law, he would agree, is not whether
most Americans, or most American writers about international law,
find a rule "reactionary," but whether that rule represents the ex-
pectations of the world community, and is necessary to the possibility
of peace within it. In international law studies, Moore says, our goal
should be to understand the community policies at stake; to clarify
and define them as they bear on the circumstances of particular cases;
and to determine the respective weight we should assign to each rele-
vant variable in deciding whether a given use of force does or does
not transgress community norms.
Moore's analysis defines "intervention" in a foreign civil war with
precision. It is, he points out, the most important problem in world
31. Book Review, Soft on Vietnam, Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 12, 1973, at 27.
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politics today, next to that of nuclear deterrence. In a turbulent world,
revolution has become endemic, particularly in the Third World. In
many cases foreign states, large or small, intervene in such conflicts,
which are nominally intrastate in character, but often involve the in-
ternational use of force. Putting economic, political and cultural in-
tervention to one side, he focuses on "coercive actions by one inter-
national actor aimed at the authority structures of another and effectu-
ated through military strategies.
' 3 2
For the simple rule of traditional international law, Moore would
substitute a complex body of rules. Such rules, he claims, would
reconcile the policies authoritatively expressed by the international
community in their application to twenty-one archetypical situations
of "intervention," divided into six classes. These situations range from
claims not relating to authority structures (military assistance to widely
recognized states in the absence of internal disorder, assistance to such
states in controlling internal disorder, and military intervention for
the protection of human rights), through intervention in anti-colonial
wars, wars of secession, indigenous conflicts for the control of internal
authority structures, external initiation of the use of force to impose
internal authority structures, and intervention in cold-war divided na-
tion conflicts. Although Moore is usually careful in distinguishing the
law that is from the law he wants to see developing, he comes close
to claiming that the treatment he proposes for the external use of
force in these twenty-one cases does in fact represent "the present in-
ternational law of non-intervention in internal conflict as well as
present community consensus permits."
3
Moore's classification of the kinds of internal disorders likely to
trigger the international use of military power is by far the best
analysis which has yet appeared. It is rooted in reality, and sensitive
to the forces which animate world politics today. It is not and cannot
be comprehensive, for, as Hamilton once remarked, "the circumstances
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite."
34 For example, the
secret emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, which Moore
perceives as a coercive threat justifying the American response, fits
into none of his categories.
Moore reaches conclusions about the legality of intervention in each
of the situations he analyzes by evaluating the relative weight in each
case of three variables: the policies favoring self-determination, self-
defense, and the protection of human rights. The heart of his con-
32. P. 129.
33. P. 280.
34. A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 23, in THE FEDERALIST 142 (E. Earle ed. 1938).
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tention in these chapters is that international law should be deemed
to admit these three possible policy justifications for the international
use of force by states, rather than self-defense alone-not in all cases,
and only after a vote by the Security Council or the General Assembly,
but in at least fifteen of the twenty-one situations into which he di-
vides his subject.35
Moore's analysis, if accepted, would have two effects. It would en-
large the possibility of foreign intervention on the side of the rebels
in civil wars, especially in behalf of claims of national self-determina-
tion. Correlatively, it would restrict the right of governments to ob-
tain foreign assistance against an insurrection, if it were generally
thought that claims of national liberation, or of human rights, out-
weighed in each instance those of public order.
Moore would require at least a General Assembly Resolution before
the legal right to use force internationally for these purposes came
into being. But such a requirement would be difficult-indeed, in
my judgment, impossible-to enforce under any imaginable model of
world politics in the near future.
Moore is not altogether consistent in the view that policies favor-
ing self-determination and humanitarian intervention can justify the
international use of force, as well as that authorizing individual and
collective self-defense. Sometimes he argues that the policy of minimum
public order is such an overriding policy goal of the world community
that a rather restrictive concept of self-defense against "armed at-
tack" should be the only possible basis for the unilateral use of force
by or from states.36 But in chapters three and four he contends that
the accepted right of a state to aid another in putting down a rebellion
should be restricted, and that states should sometimes be allowed to
use force internationally (at least when such use of force would not
unduly alarm a great power, or lead it to respond) in order to assist
rebels asserting "valid" claims of self-determination, especially in
situations they deem anti-colonial, and to protect fundamental human
rights, particularly where there is a threat of widespread loss of human
life, or where internal authority structures have collapsed or have
proved incapable of maintaining order.
IV
The result of accepting Moore's argument-and especially his first
claim for a right to use force internationally in behalf of the self-
35. Moore's argument in this regard is summarized at pp. 274-82.
56. Pp. xviii-xix. See pp. 358-59.
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determination of peoples-would be a far-reaching change in the norms
and aspirations of international law, and, I conclude, a catastrophic
change in international politics. It would gravely limit the inherent
right of collective self-defense basic to the theory of Article 51. And
it would take a long step towards recognizing the legality of "wars of
national liberation." If Moore's view were accepted, it would no longer
be correct to assert, as nearly every text-writer does, that Article 51,
and the panoply of self-help which it authorizes, is the only possible
legal justification for the unilateral use of force by states. States could
also claim such justification under the license of General Assembly
Resolutions-and, inescapably, in accordance with their own interpre-
tation and application of Moore's theorem.
Since Moore is by no means alone in making proposals of this kind,37
the argument should be examined carefully.
The Charter of the United Nations is necessarily the starting point
for an appraisal of Moore's conclusions. The Charter was achieved at
a rare moment of time-a moment of relative harmony among the na.
tions which came together as a constituent assembly at the end of a
desperate war they had barely won. Their purpose was to establish a
world organization-an organization not of people but of states, and
of states deemed "sovereign." Their Charter was a constitutive act,
like the Constitution of the United States-an attempt to state funda-
mental principles for organizing a world community of states. The
Charter is not the whole of international law, any more than the
written Constitution of the United States is the whole of our con-
stitutional law. Like the Constitution, the Charter is sketched against
a tenacious background of custom, practice, history and hope; and,
like the Constitution, or any other body of law, it evolves continuously
in response to social and moral changes in the external world, and to
changes in its own code of aspiration as well. It is an effort to re-
37. Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention
in Civil Strife, 82 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1969), reprinted in 2 TnlE VIETNAM WAI AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1089 (R. Falk ed. 1969); Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest
Proposal, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 266 (1967); Franck & Rodley, Legitimacy and Legal Rights
of Revolutionary Movements with Special Reference to the People's Revolutionary co.
eminent of South Viet Nam, 45 N.Y.U.L.Q. 679 (1970), reprinted in 3 THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 723 (R. Falk ed. 1972). These issues are also discussed, both
generally and in application to specific cases in D. BowE-r, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1958); 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TIlE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
(1965); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH TIlE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); INTERNATIONAL AsPECrs OF CIVIL STRIFE (J. Rosenau
ed. 1964); THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL VAR (R. Falk ed. 1971); TIE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS (E. Luard ed. 1972); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961); M. MCDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER (1960).
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orient and in some areas to restate pre-existing international law. It
should be read, as our best judges have always read the Constitution,
in its matrix of purpose, with primary emphasis, always, not on the
words alone, in isolation, but on the underlying theory of governance
the words seek imperfectly to express and to fulfill.
What is that theory of governance, with regard to the responsibility
of states for the international use of force? The Charter articulates
and in itself represents a number of axioms, postulates, and aspira-
tions for the society of nations: to defend and advance fundamental
human rights and the equality of men and women, and of nations
large and small; economic welfare and social justice; respect for the
integrity of treaties and other sources of international law; friendly
relations among nations based on the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples; and, above all, international peace and
security. If there is any one proposition on which all students of the
United Nations agree, it is that the overriding purpose of the Charter
was to restrict the use of force in international relations. They do not
all agree on the extent of that restriction. But if the Charter does not
revise preexisting international law in this regard, it is hard to imagine
what it can be supposed to intend.
The means to be used in promoting these diverse and sometimes
inconsistent ends are sharply defined, both by the text and by its
history. They are the familiar procedures of peace, hopefully made
more efficacious than ever before through the organs of the United
Nations, and through its availability as a center of diplomacy-the
means, that is, of international cooperation, negotiation, mediation,
adjudication, and other peaceful processes for promoting agreement
among states. The use or the threat of force is forbidden to states,
save in exercising their inherent right of self-defense and their equally
inherent right to aid other states exercising their right of self-defense.
And Article 2(7) provides that:
[N]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially with-
in the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the mem-
bers to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Article VII [the ultimate exer-
cise of its peacekeeping authority by the Security Council]. 8
38. U.N. CHARiim art. 2, para. 7.
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As Gunnar Myrdal has recently remarked, the Charter is a cove-
nant among states. "The name of the system of intergovernmental or-
ganizations," he writes, "is logically fallacious. Indeed, the very first
words of its Charter, where the active subjects enacting it are said
to be 'we, the peoples of the United Nations,' is a pious falsehood."8 0
The proposition is basic, and inescapable. The world political
process involves many transnational elements, but, especially where
the use of force is concerned, its atoms are states-states which have
never been more diverse in race, history, culture, religion, ambition,
and social organization, and never more closely pressed together by
technology and fear. Few states, however "national," consist in fact
of a single "people." Spain, for example, is one of the oldest of
modern "nations." But it contains a number of distinct peoples-Cata-
lonians and Basques, as well as Asturians, Galicians, and others less
sharply marked. Most other states-from the smallest African ministate
to Belgium, Switzerland, Canada and the U.S.S.R.-contain more than
one "people." To legitimate the international use of force in behalf
of the self-determination of peoples would threaten the integrity of
nearly every state. Like the movement of nationalism which destroyed
the Austro-Hugarian Empire, and corroded the possibility of inter-
national equilibrium in the early years of this century, a strong inter-
national movement for self-determination would force many states
to suppress liberty in the name of security, as the only alternative they
perceive to anarchy. And it would grievously weaken the safeguards
of peace.
40
To seek peace in such a world, international law has no alterna-
tive but to insist on the Charter principle that the unilateral use of
force by or from states can only be justified as individual self-defense
under Article 51, and as aid to states exercising their inherent right
of self-defense. The customary international law right of humani-
tarian intervention in situations of chaos and massacre survives under
the Charter, presumably as a form of limited self-help under Article
51 to remedy catastrophic breaches of international law which could
not otherwise be cured (i.e., the failure of the state in question to meet
its international responsibility for minimal standards of human de-
cency). A genuinely humanitarian intervention should not threaten
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, and thus
39. G. Myrdal, Towards a Critical Appraisal of the United Nations, 25 (unpublished
manuscript, to be published in 1973).
40. See E. Rosrow, LAW, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 30-32 (1968).
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should not be regarded as transgressing Article 2(4). In this respect,
the intervention in the Congo was in marked contrast to that in
Bangledesh.
These twin principles-the non-use of force and the autonomy of
states-are the foundation of the Charter, and of the system of law
built upon it. They are the only conceivable rules of peace for the
states system we have inherited, and within which we have no choice
but to live.
The Security Council is given broad powers by delegation from the
membership to exercise "primary responsibility" for maintaining in-
ternational peace and security, both through methods of persuasion,
and, when the Council can agree, through the use of force in the
name of the United Nations to deal with threats to the peace, breaches
of the peace, or acts of aggression. The general paralysis of the Security
Council as a consequence of the Cold War has meant that the United
Nations itself has rarely been able to deal with threats to or breaches
of international peace. To protect their primal security, therefore,
nations have had to rely on their own forces, or on those of allies;
as a result, the concept of individual and collective self-defense has
been given considerable scope through its application on many occa-
sions. Under these circumstances of insecurity, as Ross concludes, "it
is a fiction 41 to talk of the Charter, which allows the use of force
"only in self defense or as a contribution thereto, and as a public exer-
cise of force authorized by the Security Council,"42 as though it were
valid international law.
A rule does not become valid law simply because it is written
on paper. Article 2(4) is the expression of an idealistic aspira-
tion that does not correspond to an effective conception of law
and justice, and it is therefore unsuitable as a guide to a moral
and legal judgment of the actions of a state. Naturally, I do not
mean that a state that feels itself injured or threatened shall be
able to turn to the use of force without more ado, but only that
any judgment of such a state must be based on consideration of
the circumstances in every single case.43
The ultimate question raised by this aspect of Moore's analysis,
then, is whether the self-determination of peoples and the protec-
tion of human rights (presumably beyond the existing limits of Ar-
41. A. Ross, THE UNrED NATIONS: PEACE AND PaORwEsS 104 (1966).
42. Id. at 100.
43. Id. at 104.
849
The Yale Law Journal
ticle 51) should be considered as possible justifications for the inter-
national use of force by states. When a "people" within a widely
recognized state is rebelling, or attempting to secede, under circum-
stances in which Moore would consider the goal of self-determination
to out-balance that of minimum world public order, he would deny
states their usual right to aid the first state in putting down the
rebellion. He would recognize, on the contrary, a right to assist the
rebels. Similarly, the world is full of states which, in the eyes of some
or many beholders, violate fundamental human rights, or even mini-
mal standards of human decency. Confronting such phenomena, should
international law authorize large or small states to invade at will in
the name of achieving, let us say, equal treatment for women, uni-
versal suffrage, freedom of travel, or the elimination of racial or re-
ligious discrimination?
Moore seeks to soften the implications of his thesis by contending
that only a collective decision by the United Nations-conceivably even
by a regional organization-could bring such "rights" into existence.
Acknowledging the paralysis of the Security Council, he would treat
resolutions of the General Assembly as authoritative declarations of
international law, despite the fact that Articles 9-22 of the Charter
say that resolutions are no more than "recommendations," save for
exceptional cases like Articles 17 (budget) and 85 (trusteeship terri-
tories).
While some Resolutions of the General Assembly, genuinely sup-
ported by states representing the bulk of the world's population and
leadership, should indeed be taken seriously as evidence of the state
of opinion of the world community, many are irresponsible political
gestures, justified by their supporters on the ground that they are
only recommendations, and make no real difference anyway. Moore
acknowledges the unrepresentative and occasionally "schizophrenic"
character of the General Assembly.44 But he finds it preferable to
pretend that the Assembly is a parliamentary body rather than to as-
sert publicly that states have a unilateral right to use force interna-
tionally in civil wars to support rebels whose cause they regard as just.
By formulating the question in this way, Moore forces himself to
choose between the horns of a non-existent dilemma-a dilemma en-
tirely of his own making. His basic error is to accept his opponents'
major premise: that what he calls the traditional rule (allowing inter-
44. Pp. 228-33, 276. See J. CASTENADA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNiTED NATIONS RESOLtUIIONS
(1969). Cf. Note, The United Nations, Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions,
82 YALE L.J. 533 (1973).
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national assistance to states but not to rebels in a civil war) must be
revised in order to allow "revolution" some scope against the Maginot
Line of the status quo. It is no wonder that at this point his argu-
ment becomes a classical Parkinsonian retreat from reality.
45
There is no chance whatever, and no present prospect of a chance,
to persuade the Security Council or the General Assembly to adopt
responsible rules providing for the continuous surveillance of inter-
vention in civil disputes, the reporting of arms assistance, and the
other desirable proposals Moore makes for strengthening interna-
tional peacekeeping machinery. 46
The sensible course, I submit, is to reject Moore's premise-that the
"traditional" rule is dead, or, in the nature of the states system, can
or should be killed. Then one can reject both halves of his argument:
the thought on the one hand that states can or should be denied their
inherent right to obtain assistance from others in putting down a re-
bellion, and conceded a legal right to help certain approved revolts
against the authority of a state; and, on the other, the hair-raising
proposition that the General Assembly can assert the power to waive
the applicability of Article 2(4), and make authoritative pronounce-
ments of international law by the simple device of passing Resolutions.
One can test the implications of Moore's theory by asking a hypo-
thetical question. Suppose a revolt "begins" among the Macedonians
in Greece, and increases to the level of "insurgency" or even "bellig-
erency." Greece's NATO allies would be required by Moore's version
of international law to become neutral, or at least to keep their aid
to Greece below the pre-insurgency level, unless it could be clearly
and publicly established by a U.N. fact-finding commission that the
rebels were receiving substantial military assistance from abroad. If
the General Assembly passed a resolution blessing the struggle of the
Macedonian people for self-determination, it would become lawful
for Bulgaria, Roumania and the Soviet Union to assist the rebels in
Greece, and unlawful for Greece's NATO allies who recognize the
government of Greece to come to her aid.
This cannot be the law. However much weight one gives to cer-
tain General Assembly Resolutions, no such resolution can strip a
state of its legal right to defend itself, and to receive military assistance
from others who recognize its government. Nor can other states be
deprived of their equally fundamental legal right under Article 51
45. See E. Rosrow, PEAcE IN = lE BATArt' c 48.49 (1972).
46. Pp. 228-46.
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to help a state, which, in its judgment, and theirs, is indeed validly
exercising its inherent right of self-defense.
The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense con-
firmed by Article 51 of the Charter is the ultimate bulwark of na-
tional safety-the right to fight for survival when the Security Council
and every other institution for keeping the peace fails. The exercise
of the right of self-defense is expressly left under the Charter to the
state which feels itself threatened, and to those which choose to go
to its aid. The prior permission of the Security Council is not re-
quired, as is the case for enforcement action by regional organizations
under Article 53. The Security Council can overrule what has been
done in the name of individual and collective self-defense under Ar-
ticle 51. It also has extensive-but hardly unlimited-discretion under
Article 39 and Article 2(7) to classify a given situation as a threat to
peace. It would stand the Charter on its head, however, to suppose
that the Security Council had the legal power to determine that the
continued membership of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in the Soviet Union,
or of Quebec in Canada, or of Ulster in the United Kingdom, con-
stituted a threat to the peace, as a deprivation of rights of self-deter-
mination possessed by the peoples concerned. And, in any case, action
by the Council is subject to the veto of any permanent member.
All students of the subject agree that Article 51 was one of the
most fully considered provisions of the Charter at San Francisco, and
that without it the Charter would not have been approved and ratified.
The contention that the General Assembly can do what the Se-
curity Council cannot do-narrow and even annul the rights of self-
defense confirmed in Article 51-is thus simply untenable. It cannot
be reconciled with the basic conception of the United Nations as an
organization, and with the nature of the relationships among states,
and between states and the United Nations, which characterize world
politics today.
This reasoning would deny the ultimate autonomy of states within
the state system-the degree of autonomy they expected, and were
assured, at San Francisco. It stands on the same footing as a claim, if
one could conceive of it being put forward, that Congress could pass
a statute depriving small states of their right to equal representation
in the Senate.
What Moore disparages as the "traditional" rule of international
law on the subject, however many times he calls it "abstract," "con-
ceptual," "sterile," and "simplistic," is not nearly so dead as he sug-
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gests. I should contend on the contrary that it is basic to the con-
ception of the world community as a community of states in tie
turbulent last third of the twentieth century. In the Biafra case, like
that of Ceylon and Tanzania, and of Greece in the late forties, it is
apparent, as a matter of descriptive analysis, that the international
community accepted it as the order of nature that governments could
legally obtain international assistance in putting down insurrections,
while open or covert assistance to the rebels under such circumstances
was treated as obviously and categorically illegal. 47 And both in tie
Hungarian case of 1956, and the Czech case of 1968, the argument be-
fore the United Nations and elsewhere was not that the Soviet Union
could not legally assist a widely recognized government which asked
it for help in suppressing a rebellion, but that there was no such
government, and a fortiori, no such request for assistance. The inter-
vention in the Congo that ended the secession of Katanga rested on
precisely the same principle-that nations could assist the government
of the Congo, at its request, but not the secessionists.
However much one may regret the outcome in some situations
governed by this rule, the alternative would lead to even worse re-
sults-an endless war of all against all.
Moore writes as if the disastrous non-intervention policy pursued
by France and Britain during the Spanish Civil V'ar of the thirties
had somehow become, or for some unexplained reason should now
become, the norm of international law. No doctrine could more
gravely threaten the possibility of peace. At the whim of the General
Assembly, it would annul Article 2(4) as an influence on national poli-
cy, by denominating "wars of national liberation" as just wars, exempt
from the restraints of the Charter. Moore's careful caveats would soon
be engulfed. Why, after all, should the Germans or the Koreans be
denied international law "rights" which the Assembly might be willing
to acknowledge for the Biafrans, the Blacks of Angola and Mozambique,
the Palestinians, or the Lithuanians? What nations would be willing
to fight if these "rights" were exercised without the formal blessing
of a General Assembly Resolution?
47. See Campbell, The Greek Civil War, in INTERNATIONAL REGULA TION OF CIVIL I A
supra note 36, at 37, for a particularly graphic analysis of the interplay of political and
legal factors determining the outcome of the insurrection in Greece during the late
forties. Britain and the United States assisted the government of Greece. while co~ert aid
to the rebels came into Greece from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. See also TiE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR, supra note 36; Higgins, Internal l'ar and Inter-
national Law, in III THE FuTuRE OF TlE INrrNATIONAL, LEGAL ORER 81. 117-21 (C.
Black & R. Falk eds. 1971) (questioning capacity of General Assembly to legitimize inter-
national intervention in behalf of rebels in civil war).
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The United States went to great lengths in Greece, in Berlin, in
Korea, and in Vietnam to uphold the principle of Article 2(4). At
Suez, the United States opposed her two closest allies at the time,
Britain and France, in the Article's defense. Although Moore himself
intends the opposite result, his argument would sweep those prece-
dents away, and accelerate the trends in world politics which are
weakening the safeguards against anarchy so painfully achieved since
the seventeenth century. As Michael Howard points out with terrible
perception,
[P]artisan operations . . . [are] a retrograde step to the sporadic
and uncontrolled violence, the isolated and reciprocal atrocities,
of which war had so largely consisted before the state had ac-
quired a monopoly of force and channeled it along rational and
purposive ends sanctioned and to some degree controlled by
international law.48 . . . The whole governmental control of vio-




The degradation of public discourse, and even of academic dis-
course, has been the most grievous of all the blows the experience
of Korea and Vietnam has inflicted upon the American spirit. In this
perspective, Moore's work stands out as a shining exception, not be-
cause this reviewer happens to agree with many of his conclusions, but
because Moore adheres throughout his book to the highest standards
of intellectual and moral discipline. Ten years hence, he will have
nothing to regret in looking back on his writings of this melancholy
period. On the contrary, he has succeeded in transubstantiating the
raw materials of the Vietnam debate into a serious contribution to
scholarly thought.
Moore's basic purpose in Law and the Indo-China War is to ex-
amine certain critical problems of international law in their full
context of world politics. Indeed, his goal as a scholar is to formulate
the law as a method for helping to govern the process of world politics.
He criticizes governments for reaching political decisions without giv-
ing sufficient weight to considerations of international law. Rather
to this reviewer's surprise, the major flaw in Moore's book is a cer-
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tain innocence about the tragic quality of world politics. In pro-
posing preferred policies for the international law of intervention
in civil wars, he does not in my judgment base his scheme squarely
on the nature and necessities of the political process. His doctrine
would recognize a limited right to wage international war in behalf
of the self-determination of peoples, and a parallel narrowing of the
legal right of states to assist other states in the suppression of rebel-
lions against their authority. I am not persuaded by his argument for
the constitutionality of his thesis as a construction of the Charter."0
And I am convinced that his view on this subject, if accepted, would
make international peace even more difficult to achieve than is the
case today.
True to himself, Moore has confessed error on this important as-
pect of his argument. In a paper now in press, he substantially modi-
fies his position.51 Thus he demonstrates once again, on difficult ter-
rain, not only the intellectual strength but the moral quality of
his character as a scholar.
50. Pp. 228-33.
51. Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in LAv
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WoRLD ch. I (J.N. Moore ed. 1973) (in press, Johns
Hopkins University Press) (He abandons the position taken in Lw AND THE INDO.CIIINA
WAR that the General Assembly as well as the Security Council may authorize interventions
otherwise impermissible, and qualifies the authority of the Security Council to act
in such cases by noting that the Council must not act ultra vires. Pp. 35-36 of mimco-
graphed text). In other respects, Moore's new analysis of proposed standards for judging
the legality of intervention in civil wars seems only imperceptibly different from that
in his book, and remains subject to the criticisms suggested at pp. 853-54 supra. For a
clear review of the existing law on the subject, and modem practice, see I. Baow NaiE.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORcB Y STATES 317-33 (1968).
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History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and
Beginnings to 1801. By Julius Goebel, Jr. New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1971. Pp. xxv, 864. $30.00.
Reviewed by Louis H. Pollakt
In the past twenty-five years a number of historians, political sci-
entists, and lawyers have addressed themselves to the major aspects of
and actors in the Supreme Court's past; happily, a portion, albeit a
small one, of this growing literature is of great merit. But no compre-
hensive examination or appraisal of the Court, from 1790 to the pres.
ent, was even in prospect' until Congress, seeking a fitting use for the
residual estate Justice Holmes left to his country, commissioned a
multi-volume History of the Supreme Court. 2 It was appropriate for
Congress to make this enterprise the nation's monument to the judge
who, as only Marshall before and no on6 since, personified the Court
and wrought its history.
To Julius Goebel, Columbia's eminent specialist in seventeenth and
eighteenth century American legal institutions, went the honor of writ-
ing the first of the'eleven projected volumes. The first part of Professor
Goebel's book is devoted to the background-pre- and post-Revolution-
ary-of the Court's establishment and early years. This background
does much to illuminate the second part of the book, which recounts
the pioneering work of the twelve Justices (and the District Judges with
whom they sat on circuit) who preceded Marshall. It will also serve as
an indispensable introduction to the ten following volumes of the His.
tory.
Of this background the most rewarding portion, probably because
the terrain is least familiar, is the earliest, in which Goebel turns to Eng-
lish precedents for the American institution of judicial review. These
precedents are chiefly of two sorts. First there are cases from Coke's
Reports. Of these the best-known is Dr. Bonham's Case because of its
oft-quoted and ambiguous rhetoric:
t Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HIsroRY (rev. ed. 1947), although
readable and informative, does not deal with the history after 1918.
2. The devise amounted to $263,000. In 1955 Congress added to this sum an amount
in lieu of interest and established the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Fund to support
the publication of the History. Paul A. Freund, Carl M. Loeb University Professor,
Harvard University, has served as editor-in-chief. Two volumes of the History have ap-
peared: J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971) [hereinafter cited to page
number only]; C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1868, PART ONE (1971).
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And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law
will controul Acts of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to
be utterly void.3
But Goebel concludes that this case was less influential than earlier
opinions in which city or guild ordinances underwent judicial scrutiny.
We learn, for example, that in 1590, Coke, as counsel for tie City of
London, argued in defense of a challenged ordinance that:
all such ordinances constitutions or by-laws are allowed by the law,
which are made for the true and due execution of the laws or stat-
utes of the realm, or for the well government and order of the body
incorporate. And all others which are contrary or repugnant to tie
laws or statutes of the realm are void and of no effect.4
Coke was not merely making a concession arguendo. He was stating
a doctrine that was shortly to mature in judgments invalidating city
ordinances and guild rules.5 Goebel argues:
These cases and others in other contemporary reports have usually
been viewed by historians as but a phase of the aggressive reasser-
tion of judicial authority by the common law courts in which Coke
played so major a part. They are obviously something more....
The courts offered remedy for the protection of the common law
rights of individuals, and in so doing reaffirmed the supremacy of
this common law. The sovereign authority of this law was further
emphasized by solemn judgment that not even a royal patent could
validate a void ordinance, and further, that royal grants against
common right were void. To pronounce such judgments was no
small thing at a time when these courts had dangerous competitors,
and is properly to be accounted a bold vindication of a constitu-
tional principle. 6
The second set of precedents forms the bridge from English to
American law. These were the occasions, few in number but significant
in implication, when the Board of Trade (administratively) and the
Privy Council (judicially) nullified colonial legislation as transgressions
of charter limitations or royal prerogative. Here, Goebel draws heavily,
with handsome acknowledgment, on materials "exhaustively and ex-
pertly examined by Professor Joseph Henry Smith" in Appeals to the
3. 8 Coke Rep. 107, l18a (1610).
4. Chamberlain of London's Case, 5 Coke Rep. 62 (1590). 72 Eng. Rep. 769.
5. See Clark's Case, 5 Coke Rep. 64 (1596); Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore (K. B.) 576
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Privy Council from the American Plantations.1 Goebel argues per-
suasively that by the time the colonists had begun to challenge actively
the navigation and tax laws imposed by a Parliament in which they
had no voice, these two sets of precedents had coalesced in "a funda-
mental political conviction" that:
government must be conducted in conformity with the terms of
the constitution. . . . What was not fully established was where
the ultimate decision on conformity or repugnance was to be
lodged. Everything in the experience of the American lawyers,
intellectual and practical, had prepared the way for committing
this power to the judicial.
8
With 1776 and'freedom from Parliament came freedom from these
occasional constraints-whether regarded as restrictive or protective-
of the Privy Council and the Board of Trade. The concept of defined
authority was of course embodied in the constitutions of the newly
sovereign states, but, Goebel finds, in the first years of independence
the "drift was toward subversion of the original design of limited con-
stitutional government and its replacement by the unrestraint of Eng-
lish parliamentary hegemony." Whereupon, Goebel leaves the weak-
ened English cases and takes up the chase anew-tracking the hare of
judicial review across more familiar American landscape in: (1) plead-
ings, and tentative judicial utterances, in state cases prior to the Con-
stitutional Convention;' 0 (2) the Convention debates;" (3) pamphlet-
eering (including The Federalist) antecedent to, and the debates in, the
ratifying conventions; 12 (4) the enactment of the Bill of Rights;'8 (5)
the enactment of the Judiciary Act;' 4 and (6) pre-Marshall instances of
Supreme Court Justices speaking to the constitutionality of legisla-
tion' 5 or articulating the proposition that the determination of con-
stitutionality is a judicial function.' 0
Goebel's confident penetration of the post-Revolutionary materials









15. See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (1796), in which four Justices said
the Carriage Tax was constitutional. One of the four (Justice Chase) reserved the ques.
tion "whether this Court, constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of Con.
gress void, on the ground of its being made contrary to, and in violation of, the Consti-
tution .... " (Id. at 175; but see note 16 infra.)
16. See Justice Chase's charge to the jury in United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239,
257-58 (No. 14,709) (C.C.D. Va. 1800), the last of the major Sedition Act cases.
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on judicial review is masterful; he is for the most part in full and un-
challenged command. Yet, remembering that in earlier portions of the
book Goebel built upon or noted the shortcomings of the work of other
students of the pre-Revolutionary period, one wishes that he had not
approached the post-1776 years as if he had, among the present genera-
tion of historians, exclusive jurisdiction-studiously ignoring the re-
search of many of those who have come after Charles Warren, Edward
Convin, and Charles Beard. As Morton Honvitz has observed "this
approach seems ... unfortunate."
17
Particularly, I deplore Goebel's unwillingness to come to grips with
any aspect of the work of the late William IV. Crosskey.18 Since Pro-
fessor Crosskey, in his controversial-and much controverted-Politics
and the Constitution, examined in even greater detail than Goebel
many of the same problems, this omission seems difficult to justify.
One would, for example, expect to learn much from Goebel's assess-
ment of Crosskey's view of the pre-Convention state court cases. Find-
ing the cases "[i]n large part imaginary," Crosskey concluded that
they are, as a whole, unimpressive as a basis upon which to infer
that the right of judicial review was considered generally, in the
states of America, to be a normal and usual incident of "judicial
power" when the Constitution of the United States was put to-
gether.... So, the list of relevant precedents ... when the Con-
stitution was drawn, actually established no more, at most, than a
right in the courts, in two or, possibly, three of the thirteen states,
to carry on their own constitutional functions . . . and . . . dis-
regard any act of the legislature which, in their judgment, sought
to compel them to proceed differently.1"
Goebel acknowledges that the state court cases had no more "than a
remote effect upon the then-current trend" to "parliamentary hege-
mony," but nevertheless sees them as having
established . . . that issues of constitutionality might be raised in
litigation, and that courts in discharge of their duty to administer
justice must take cognizance of such and adjudicate them.20
These quotations may, on quick reading, suggest a minor difference
in emphasis, but their implications are of major significance. Goebel
17. Horwitz, Book Review, 85 ILRV. L. REv. 1076, 1077 (1972).
18. Professor Horwitz notes that Goebel "nowhere mentions" W. CRoss E, PoLrrcs
AND THE CoNsTrunoN (1953) or BERGER, CONGRESS V. Tim SUPRE.E CO tRT (1969). Honiz,
supra note 11.
19. 'V. CRossKaY, PoLrcs AND THE CONsrrTIUTON 947-75 (1953).
20. P. 142.
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sees in these early state precedents the American roots of that general
power of judicial review we now take for granted. Crosskey, however,
distilled from the same cases authority for the much narrower concept
of judicial review which he believed to have constitutional legitimacy:
[T]he Court does no more than perform, according to its best
judgment, the duties which these several provisions [of the Consti-
tution defining and describing the exercise of the judicial func-
tion] ... impose directly upon it ... free of interference either by
the President or by Congress. 21
Crosskey may well have been wrong, even very wrong, both in his
evaluations of the state cases and in his ultimate conclusions about the
scope of the "judicial power" conferred by Article III of the Consti-
tution. But it would have been instructive for those of us who, unlike
Goebel and Crosskey, are not steeped in the primary sources, to be in-
formed by Goebel as to where and how Crosskey's analysis went astray.22
Similarly, it would have been instructive to have had Goebel discuss
Crosskey's contradictory reading of certain primary data used by both.
For example, both eschewed reliance on Daniel Call's 1827 reconstruc-
tion of Commonwealth v. Caton, the Virginia Court of Appeals deci-
sion which Reporter Call characterized as:
[T]he first case in the United States where the question relative
to the nullity of an unconstitutional law was ever discussed before
a judicial tribunal: and the firmness of the judges (particularly
Mr. Wythe) was highly honorable to them; and will always be
21. 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 18, at 1004. Any generalized power of "judicial review
against Congress" was, in Crosskey's view, "not intended, or provided in the Constitution;
it was a product of the events and policies of later times." Id. at 1046. But see the Court's
entitlement and obligation "to defend all those rights of the nation against the
states ... ." Id.
22. Not having examined the primary sources, and hence being forced to rely on com-
parative evaluations of Crosskey's and Goebel's work, I am intuitively convinced that
Crosskey took too restrictive a view of the state cases. Agreeing with Crosskey that the
state cases do not evidence "that . . . judicial review was considered generally . . . to
be a normal and usual incident of 'judicial power' when the Constitution of the United
States was put together" (see p. 859). 1 also agree with the late Henry Hart, whose con-
clusions appear fully to support Goebel's (see p. 859), that the state cases seem to show
that:
[P]ower [of judicial review] had been repeatedly asserted, seldom if ever flatly
negatived, and on at least three occasions actually exercised before the Constitution
was signed.
Hart, Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 HAPv. L. REV. 1456, 1463 (1954). 1 fur-
ther agree with Hart that the state cases do not show that the power asserted was
deemed to be limited to instances of invasion of judicial authority by other branches of
government. Id. But I also agree with Hart that "[t]o evaluate his [Crosskcy's] con-
clusions precisely would require an independent study of the sources." Id. It seens re-
grettable that Goebel's "independent study of the sources" did not, at least in passing,
take into account Crosskey's earlier study and inconsistent inferences.
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applauded, as having incidentally, fixed a precedent, whereon, a
general practice, which the people of this country think essential
to their rights and liberty, has been established.
23
Crosskey (like Louis Boudin twenty years before)2 4 found Call guilty
of embroidering on the extant records, and perhaps even of fabricating
some out of whole cloth.25 Crosskey therefore chose to rely on notes
contemporaneous with the case and a letter to Madison, written at the
time of the case by Presiding Judge Edmund Pendleton 28 -the very
respected senior jurist who was later to preside at the decisive Virginia
ratifying convention. Goebel also notes inconsistencies between Call
and Pendleton, and confines himself to the latter's notes.2 7 The oddity
is that working from the same notes, Goebel and Crosskey disagreed
not only with Call but with each other as to how many of the eight
Court of Appeals judges acknowledged a judicial power to declare laws
unconstitutional.
It is common ground among Call, Crosskey, and Goebel that Chan-
cellor Wythe-law tutor of Jefferson and Marshall, later a delegate to
the Constitutional Convention and the Virginia ratifying convention
-avowed such judicial power.28 And it is also common ground that
23. 4 Call. (8 Va.) 5 (1782). The case involved the effect of pardons voted by the House
of Delegates for persons convicted of treason in the Revolution. The Attorney General
(Edmund Randolph) contended that the pardons, not concurred in by the Senate, were
ineffective, in the face of a statute apparently vesting the power to pardon traitors in the
General Assembly as a whole. Counsel for the prisoners argued that the statutory limi-
tation on the authority to pardon conflicted with a provision of the Virginia Constitu-
tion. A majority of the judges found the statute valid and hence the pardons ineffective.
But how many of the judges acknowledged a power to disregard a statute found to be
invalid is in doubt. See pp. 861-63.
24. 1 L. BOUDIN, Gov.RN.%iFaT BY JUDICIARY 531-35 (1932).
25. 2 CRossKEY, supra note 18, at 952, 960.
26. Id. at 958.
27. P. 126. The standard biography of Pendleton utilized the Pendleton notes exten-
sively but relied unquestioningly on Call in setting forth the opinion delivered by Chan-
cellor Wythe. 2 D. MAYS, EDMUND PENDLETON 1721-1803, at 197.98 (1952). Crosskey, a
year after publication of Mays' work, cast serious doubt on Call's version of W)the's
opinion. An anthology of constitutional materials, published thirteen years after Cross.
key's book, quotes from Call's version of Wythe's opinion, and points out Louis Boudin's
doubts of the authenticity of Call's report, but does not mention Crosskey. 1 L PoL.AK,
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMEM*TARY HmsToRy 188 (1966). One
can only surmise that the anthologist was lamentably wholly unaware that Crosskey had
studied the Caton case in depth. In R. BERER, CONGRESS v. TiE SUi'RESiE COURT (1969)
which Goebel does not mention, see note 18 supra, the author refers to the doubts about
Caton expressed by Boudin and by Crosskey, though Bierger is "little disposed to rely on
either .... " Id. at 103. In his most recent book, IMPEACtIE.MTI TiE CONsTirrrubosA
PROBLE Ms (1973), Berger refers twice to an earlier book (id. at 209 n.85, 212 n.98) and
once to an article by Goebel (id. at 4 n.28); he also cites Crosskey's opus three times (id.
at 77 n.124, 91 n.178, 153 n.141).
28. What is doubtful here is just how Wythe articulated his position. Croiskey de-
clined to credit, and Goebel seems to have reserved judgment on, the magnificent words
attributed to Wythe by Call:
I have heard of an english chancellor who said, and it was nobly said, that it was
his duty to protect the rights of the subject, against the encroachments of the crown;
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Pendleton explicitly refrained from expressing a view as to whether
such a power existed.20 Pendleton's notes, moreover, apparently refute
Call's statement that Chancellor Blair (later a delegate to the Constitu-
tional Convention and a Justice of the Supreme Court),
and the rest of the judges, were of opinion, that the court had
power to declare any resolution or act of the legislature, or of
either branch of it, to be unconstitutional and void .... 80
According to both Goebel and Crosskey, Blair was noncommittal on
the existence of such a power, while Judge Lyons was quite outspoken
as to its nonexistence. 31 Goebel also adds that Judge Dandridge " 'de-
clined the question.' "32 Given Pendleton's position, this would appear
to mean that at least four of the eight judges reserved judgment or were
against any judicial power to nullify legislation. Crosskey read the Pen-
dleton notes to mean that, excluding Lyons, five of the eight judges
were noncommittal (although four of those five-Blair, Pendleton,
Cary, and Chief Justice Carrington-appear to have viewed the chal-
lenged statute as constitutional);3 3 only Wythe and Mercer recognized
the power, and only Mercer voted to exercise it.34 But Goebel asserts
that: "Five [judges] decided explicitly or by inference that the Court
of Appeals had the power to declare a law void for unconstitution-
ality."3 Just how Crosskey counted five as noncommittal is unex-
plained. And just how Goebel counted five as "explicitly or by infer-
and that he would do it, at every hazard. But if it was his duty to protect a solitary
individual against the rapacity of the sovereign, surely, it is equally mine, to protect
one branch of the legislature, and, consequently, the whole community, against the
usurpations of the other: and, whenever the proper occasion occurs, I shall feel the
duty; and, fearlessly perform it. Whenever traitors shall be fairly convicted, by the
verdict of their peers, before the competent tribunal, if one branch of the legislature,
without the concurrence of the other, shall attempt to rescue the offenders from the
sentence of the law, I shall not hesitate, sitting in this place, to say, to the general
court, Fiat justitia, ruat coelum; and, to the usurping branch of the legislature, you
attempt worse than a vain thing; for, although, you cannot succeed, you set an ex-
ample, which may convulse society to its centre. Nay more, if the whole legislature,
an event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to them
by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the country, will meet the
united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution, will
say, to them, here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no
further.
Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call. (8 Va.) 5, 8 (1782).
29. See 2 MAYS, supra note 27, at 198.
30. Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call. (8 Va.) at 20 (1782). According to Crosskey, Judge
Mercer did agree with Wythe on the existence of the power but, unlike Wythe, concluded
that the challenged statute was indeed unconstitutional. 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 18, at
959.
31. P. 127; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 18, at 958-59.
32. P. 127.
33. See the summary of the voting in 2 MAYS, supra note 27, at 196-201.
34. 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 18, at 958-59.
35. P. 127.
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ence" committed is also unexplained, and very likely unexplainable."0
One wishes that Goebel had tried to shed light not only on his own
arithmetic but Crosskey's as well.
I have selected this one set of issues-issues which lie at the heart of
Goebel's study-which could have profited from reference to Crosskey's
recent and intensive research. There are others, not bearing directly
on judicial review, which Crosskey examined in depth and to which
Goebel devotes substantial attention-yet here again Crosskey's find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, some consonant with Goebel's and
some not, are passed by in silence.3
7
Crosskey's extraordinary opus has, of course, fared badly at the hands
of many qualified critics, Goebel among them.38 It also has had its share
-some would say more than its share-of praise.30 I happen to be one
36. See Horwitz, supra note 17, at 1080 n.7.
37. Three issues come to mind. First, whether Charles Warren in his article. Brandeis
and the Court in Erie, and Holmes in Black &' White Taxicab Co. were right in rejecting
Story's unwillingness in Swift to regard state court decisions as "laws" within the mean-
ing of § 34 of the Judiciary Act. Warren, New Light on the History of Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARv. L. Rxv. 49, 81-88 (1923); Eric v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Black &
White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J..
dissenting); Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). Goebel seems to side with Warren, while
Crosskey out-Storied Story. Pp. 502-03; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 13, at 820-21, 866.69. 912-16.
A second question is whether the Article III vesting of the "judicial power" in the
Supreme Court "and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish" was, as Goebel suggests, a constitutional imperative designed "to assure
that federal inferior courts must be created, and further that designation of state tri-
bunals would not do." P. 247. This view is consonant with Story's, and, apparently, with
Crosskey's. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE Co.rsTrno.v 449.52 (1833); 1 CnossE.
supra note 18, at 612-18. This view did not prevail in Congress during the drafting of
the Judiciary Act, or at any time since, which Warren viewed as fortunate. Warren, supra,
at 631-32.
A third problem is whether, as Goebel concludes, the Judiciary Act did not contem-
plate a federal common law of crime-a conclusion in accord with Justice Chase's views
and with that later adopted by the Supreme Court in Hudson &' Goodwin. Pp. 495-96.
631-32; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (1812). This is contrary to
the views of Chief Justice Ellsworth and Judge Peters, of Justice Story, of Warren and of
Crosskey. Pp. 630-32; United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 619 (No. 14,857) (C.C.D. Mass.
1813) (disapproved at I Wheat. 415 (1816) when the Attorney General declined to urge
the Court to reconsider its holding in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, supra);
Warren, supra, at 73; 2 CRossIEv, supra note 18, at 767-84.
I think it fair to say that Crosskey did not regard the three issues summarized above
as discrete: linking and transcending them, for Crosskey, was the overriding constitutional
imperative that the Supreme Court was intended to head a national judiciary with
authority to review state and federal court judgments on "common law" questions. This,
for Crosskey, had as its parallel another constitutional imperative-that Congress was
constitutionally intended to exercise general legislative authority, an intention not ful-
filled because of latter-day failures to comprehend, inter alia, Lite scope of the phrale
"commerce among the several states." Crosskey's constitutional imperatives are heroic in
conception but, in my judgment, on balance quite unsupported by the aailable data.
38. Goebel, Ex Parle Clio, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 450 (1954); see Fairman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental Authority, 21 U. oF Cii:.
L. REv. 40 (1953); Hart, Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review', 67 H~nv. L. REv. 1456
(1954); Brant, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REv. (1954); Brown, Book Resicw, 67 HAM. L
REv. 1439.
39. See Clark, Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence of Erie-Tomnphins,
21 U. CHI. L. Rav. 24 (1953); Hamilton, The Constitution-Apropos of Crosshey, id. at 79;
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who finds the main thrust of Crosskey's several theses wholly unper-
suasive, yet I certainly do not feel entitled to argue that all of his
numerous perceptions are intellectual pariahs. No less a student of
legal history than Arthur Corbin felt Crosskey has produced "a work
of originality and a work of courage" and "that the author's only desire
was to present the truth, that he had used the proper methods of re-
search to determine the facts, and that the facts as he found them had
induced the opinions that he expressed." 40 Still the real issue goes be-
yond challenges to, and defenses of, Crosskey's intellectual good faith.
The real issue is whether so huge an investigative enterprise as Cross-
key's is to be excluded from the marketplace of ideas. For surely Goe-
bel's non-mention of Crosskey cannot be explained by inattentiveness or
indifference to available data, qualities which are belied by every page
of Goebel's work. The more plausible explanation seems to be that
Goebel has boycotted a book he doesn't like. But such a boycott is in
restraint of the scholar's trade: "The writing of history requires maxi-
mum effort in the discovery of evidence and the utmost candor in pres-
entation, for in no other way can the interests of truth be served."' 41
To some it may seem captious to fault an author for what he has not
examined. And if Goebel's book were less ambitious, I would be less
prone to criticize. But it is precisely because of its scope and excellence
that I must hold the author to strict account for lacunae which are
unworthy of him. For I wholly agree with Professor Horwitz's assess-
ment that Goebel's book "is likely to remain for a long time to come
the definitive account of American constitutional history from the set-
tlement of America to the Chief Justiceship of John Marshall .... ,,42
A book which is to occupy so strategic a place in American historiogra-
phy should illuminate, not obscure, the prior art.
Goebel's book, comprehensive as it is, does not fill the field of early
constitutional history. It is a lawyer's history, focusing on legal processes
and institutions. It throws little new light on the ideas which animated
the men who cast off English rule and built a new federal republic. This
is a limitation to be noted, but it is of a very different sort than the one
I have censured. For this is a limitation which describes the outer lim-
Krash, A More Perfect Union: The Constitutional World of William Winslow Cross/wy,
id. at 1 (1953); Sharp, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 439 (1954); cf. Braden, Book Re-
view, 62 YALE L.J. 1145 (1953).
40. Corbin, Book Review, 62 YALE L.J. 1137, 1144, 1145 (1953).
41. Goebel, Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 450, 451 (1954).
42. Horwitz, supra note 17, at 1077.
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its of the agenda Goebel set himself. Perhaps because he recognized
that he is uniquely equipped to handle lawyers' matters, Goebel did
not undertake to examine in depth the intersections of constitutional
history and political theory and practice. And since important new
studies of this sort have recently appeared,43 it is as well that Goebel
allocated his own prodigious energies as he did. A major dividend of
this extraordinary book is that it will greatly facilitate the further ex-
ploration by others of matters not central to its inquiry.
43. Horwitz points out that "there is no indication that he [Goebel] has cared to
consider two brilliant recent reinterpretations of American constitutional history. Bernard
Ballyn's Ideological Origins of the American Revolution and Cordon S. Wood's The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787." Supra note 17, at 1077. See also P. Eiw.-
BERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMIERIcAN CoNSTTioN (1968); EssAys o- TIE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (L. Levy ed. 1969); C.A. MILLER, TIlE SUPaRlE COURT AND THE UsEs OF
HISTORY (1969); R.R. PALMER, THE ACE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERIcAr- 1760-1800 (1964); R.A. RUTLAND, TiHE ORDEAL OF TIlE
CONsrruTION: THE ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787-1788 (1966);
C. Rossrr.R, 1787: THE GRA~n CONVENTION (1966).
The Big Foundations. By Waldemar Nielsen. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 475. $10.95.
Reviewed by Adam Yarmolinskyt
One comes away from any examination of the major charitable
foundations in the United States convinced that seldom have so few
been blamed for so much by so many, when they have done so little.
But an explanation is not far to seek: in this comprehensive, analytical
account of the apex of the philanthropic pyramid, Nielsen observes
that "institutions that have operated too aggressively on aristocratic
premises in a 'democratic context have often suffered because of it."'
Towards the top, this pyramid has a particularly small cross-section.
The thirty-three general-purpose, grant-making foundations that are
the subject of Nielsen's study own more than half the $20.5 billion of
assets controlled by approximately 25,000 United States foundations
- Ralph Waldo Emerson University Professor, University of Massachusetts. B.A. 1943,
Harvard University; LL.B., 1948, Yale University.
1. W. NmI.sEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 595 (1972) [hereinafter cited to page number
only].
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of all sizes in business ii 1968.2 And Nielsen reports a 1969 Forucne
estimate that seven percent of the foundations control ninety percent
of foundation assets.3 Of the top thirty-three, only ten have what
Nielsen characterizes as reasonably well-developed and capable staffs;'
at the point of the pyramid, the Ford Foundation, with more than a
third of the group's total assets, has about twice as many professional
staff members as the next nine put together.5
At the same time, all foundations as a group contributed less than
ten percent of the cost of operating the private, non-profit sector of
the economy,' the so-called Third Sector, even apart from the enor-
mous and growing investment of government at all levels in parallel
activities. And most make no distinctive or innovative contributions
to the Third Sector. As Nielsen puts it,
The majority are unprofessional, passive, ameliorative institu-
tions: they basically offer the multitude of useful non-profit or-
ganizations in American life which depend on contributions 'an-
other door to knock on' in meeting their current operating needs
and capital requirements. 7
Nielsen points out that even the right-wing foundations have given
relatively little to extremist causes.8 The quality of most foundation
giving is determined to a great extent by the shibboleths of "collegiali-
ty" or, "We're all upper-middle class WASP's together," which, as
Nielsen demonstrates, have been generally applied by foundation
boards in coopting new trustees. In fact, one of the most promising
developments in the foundation world is the beginning diversification
of boards of trustees (notably those of Ford, Rockefeller, and Ketter-
ing), although it is probably too early to assess their impact on grant-
making policies.
But despite the very limited size of the foundation sector, and the
eminent respectability and judicious self-restraint of the largest insti-
tutions, foundations as a class have been the object of considerable
public hostility over the last twenty years-hostility expressed in po-
litical invective from both the right and left, congressional hearings,
2. P. 21.
3. P. 24, n.t.
4. P. 323. But some of the smaller foundations, in the $20-20 million range, have quite
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and clearly punitive legislation. 9 And while there is currently a lull
in legislative activity, this hostility shows no signs of abating.
The hostility that attaches to foundations is not, however, trans-
ferred to individual donors-and for a reason. It is a fundamental tenet
of the American ethos that a man should be free to do as he pleases
with his own money. If a wealthy individual gains special tax advan-
tages from his gift to a foundation, public resentment attaches to the
individual as a taxpayer (or non-taxpayer), and his charitable giving
is likely to be thrown into the pot with a variety of other tax avoidance
devices. But when an institution is created that symbolizes the avoid-
ance of taxes, that is administered by a self-perpetuating body often
excluding those who made the money originally, and that is seen not
as doing one particular job-whether educating people, healing them,
or ministering to their souls-but rather as a generalized source of
power in society-money on the loose-it quickly becomes a target. By
its very existence, a foundation is asserting a kind of aristocratic prem-
ise, and it need not exhibit any great degree of aggressiveness to suf-
fer the consequences. It is a better target than any honest (or dishonest)
businessman because it lacks the excuse that it is only trying to turn
a profit. It is a better target than any labor union or any political
party because it lacks a constituency, save its own grantees, who are
typically outnumbered several times over by unsuccessful grant appli-
cants.
Given these vulnerabilities, and the limited character of their
achievements, are the foundations worth saving? Nielsen answers with
a somewhat tentative affirmative. In light of the general breakdown
of confidence in government and the resurgence of interest in the
Third Sector, he is prepared to urge that we take the "gamble" of
giving the foundations "a further chance"-in large part because there
are no other available "well-funded institutions" to serve as agents
of change.
The paradox, as Nielsen recognizes, is that the more foundations
begin to do the socially useful job they might do, the more likely they
9. All these phenomena are fully described in Chapter I, "Philanthropy Under Fire."
Pp. 3-20. The legislative sanctions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 include the four
percent tax on foundation income (arguably to cover costs of administering the Act).
preferential treatment for contributions to operating charities both in percentage of
income deductible and in valuation of appreciated gifts, and the flat ban on political
activity in lieu of the old substantiality test. The new requirement of expenditure re-
sponsibility for foundation grants to all but public charities may be justified as a prudent
measure to assure that the purposes of the charitable exemption are fulfilled, but it
has the practical effect of discouraging contributions to small, new or controversial or-
ganizations. See TAx INsTrrUtE OF Am tucA, TAx I.spAcrs oN Pt-LA.N4imotRY (1972).
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are to get into trouble with their critics. More grants for the kind of
study Ralph Nader has made of Congress10 would not endear founda-
tions to congressional leadership; nor would more funding of the kind
of study Marian Wright Edelman has made of the pace of school de-
segregation" endear them to the Justice Department. Playing out an-
other round inevitably means raising the stakes. Yet in the process of
reaching this less-than-enthusiastic recommendation for an extended
gamble, Nielsen catalogs a number of quite extraordinary enterprises
over the last forty years-from Myrdal's American Dilemma12 to Sesame
Street-that might not have been carried off without foundation
support.
In a brief Epilogue on "Prospects for Self-Reform and Self-Renewal,"
Nielsen concludes that the prospects for a successful gamble depend
on two conditions:
[F]irst, if the members of the leadership class of American so-
ciety, essentially the business class, who control the major founda-
tions, have become sufficiently aroused by the dangers of the
present situation to overcome their habitual inertia, and second,
if the "public interest" movements such as Common Cause and
Nader's Raiders will begin to generate sustained pressure upon
foundations for reform. In effect, the best hope for progress rests
largely upon a curious combination of forces-the ethic of social
responsibility of the old Establishment and the militancy of some
of the newer forms of expression of social discontent-working not
necessarily in concert but at least on an object of common con-
cern.13
Shortly after the publication of Nielsen's book, the American As-
sembly convened a group, including the heads of several major foun-
dations, as well as non-philanthropoid scholars, journalists, and public
officials, to consider the future of foundations. The statement that
emerged from their three-day deliberations suggested that:
[F]oundations should offer a wide range of counselling and con-
sulting services to applicants, grantees and other interested par-
ties .... [They] must take positive steps to minimize secretiveness.
10. M. GREEN, J. FALLOWS & D. ZWICK, RALPH NADER CONGRESS PROJECT: WHO RUNS
CONGRESS? (1972).
11. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITIEE, DELTA 'MINISTRY OF TIlE NATIONAL COUN-
CIL OF CHURCHES, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, LAWYERS CONsTrITU-
TIONAL DEFENSE COMMITEE, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., & WASHINGTON RESEARCH
PROJECT, THE STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH 1970 (1970); IT'S NOT OVER
IN THE SOUTH: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN FORTY-THREE SOUTHERN CITIES EIGIITEEN YEARS
AFTER BROWN (1972).
12. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1962).
13. Pp. 433, 434.
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... [B]ecause annual reports will not be widely read . . . [they]
must explore other methods ... of encouraging greater interest,
response, and criticism ...
Foundations should view themselves as service resources to
grantees as well as providers of funds. 14
What the report is saying, in effect, is that foundations need to de-
velop a more active constituency among the people and institutions
who depend on them for at least a part-often the critical part-of their
support.
Whether it is worth the effort for the Third Sector to provide that
constituency is a separate question. I would argue that it is. The Third
Sector is currently in serious difficulties, economically and politically.
Economically, because most Third Sector activities are highly labor-
intensive (schools, churches, libraries, museums, symphonies) and their
relative costs continue to rise as their productivity more and more lags
behind that of the general economy. It takes as many man-hours to
perform a Beethoven symphony today as it did in Beethoven's time.
Politically, because the sense of community in the country is being
eroded by a host of factors, from increasing suburbanization to de-
creasing political leadership, and Third Sector support is very much
a function of this sense of community.
Even if government financing of the Third Sector is substantially
increased (and the current trend both locally and nationally15 seems
to be in the opposite direction), there is a need for alternative sources
in order to maintain even minimal independence. General public soli-
citations seem to be increasingly expensive in terms of their results,
and individual patrons are hard to find and still harder to educate. The
Third Sector needs the foundations; it must help protect them from
the Know-Nothings, who resent any expression of disinterested concern
for the general welfare. But it also should help protect them from in-
ternal decay or ossification, through a continuing process of mutual
education. It must encourage them to be more adventurous, more
experimental, yet more conscious of their ongoing role in the evolving
life support system of the Third Sector itself.
14. THE FuTruRE OF FOUNDATIONS: THE REPORT OF TIlE 4Isr ARICAN A .4SMILY,
NOVEMBER 2-5, 1972, at 5 (F. Heimann ed. 1973).
15. Government must learn to take less from people so people can do more for
themselves. Let each of us remember that America was built not by government,
but by people-not by welfare, but by work-not by shirking responsibility, but by
seeking responsibility.
Transcript of President Nixon's Second Inaugural Address to the Nation, N.Y. Times,
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